

NSA, NAVY, OSD & DIA Declassification/Release Instructions on File.

MEMORANDUM FOR: Deputy Director for Intelligence
SUBJECT : DIA and the Service Intelligence Agencies

1. The creation of DIA in 1961 led initially to a substantial drawdown of personnel in the three service intelligence agencies as persons from the Air Force (in particular), the Army, and the Navy (to a much lesser extent) were transferred to give DIA an operating capability. The initial increments largely stripped the service agencies of ^{their} current and estimate ^{ive} production ^{assets.} ~~persons~~. Later stages saw the assimilation of the major research-oriented production components, as well as the collection, dissemination, and requirements groups. ^{42.} At this time DIA has some 4,400 persons in the Washington area. About 2,300 of them work under the Assistant Director for Intelligence Production (Major 25X1A [REDACTED] Other major components include Scientific and Technical Intelligence, Collection, Plans and Programs, and Mapping, Charting, and Geodesy. In addition, DIA runs the Defense Intelligence School at Anacostia, the world-wide attache system, and a host of related activities.

3. The service intelligence agencies responded in various ways to the creation of DIA. The Air Force placed its tech intelligence people under the AF Systems Command and renamed the shop at Wright-Patterson the Foreign Technology Division. The Army was slower to react but has, in the last couple years, taken steps to augment its staff, in part by creating a field unit at Ft. Meade for which, I understand, some 40 spaces were re-programmed out of other Army personnel allotments. The Navy fought hardest against the integrative thrust of DIA's creation and has succeeded, for example, in keeping its Sigint-center^{ed} submarine OOB unit at Ft. Meade out of the DIA structure. I am told that Navy's intelligence component today is somewhat larger than when DIA was established, in part because certain activities that previously lay outside ONI have lately been grouped under Admiral Fluckey.

4. ~~I regret~~ I cannot quantify the details but it is my impression, based on long and continuous association with a wide range of acquaintances through^{out} the Pentagon intelligence structure, that the service intelligence agencies have largely recaptured the numbers of positions initially lost to DIA and that, in the substantive areas of most concern to their Departments,

their analytical and production capabilities have substantially returned to pre-DIA levels.

4. It is my understanding that the extraordinary current intelligence production demands caused by the preoccupation of the Secretary of Defense and the Joint Chiefs with Vietnam are largely borne by DIA and its management. To the degree that this is so, it leaves the service agencies relatively free to concentrate on the kinds of questions that have agitated NIE 11-3 and other estimates in recent years.

5. DIA is ^{both} ~~both~~ the intelligence support component of the Office of the Secretary of Defense and the J-2 element of the Joint Staff. ~~Out of this duality grows innumerable problems for the people in DIA and for those of us who work with them.~~ It is not uncommon for DIA to be tasked to support both a System Analysis paper and a Joint Staff paper on the same subject, each intent on a different policy recommendation. The military officers who constitute the leadership of DIA from the middle echelons and up tend to identify with the Joint Chiefs, rather than with OSD. The result is that the people in OSD are generally suspicious of the objectivity of DIA's analysis and impatient with its conservative approach to

any new question; the people in DIA, for their part, feel constantly badgered into providing data which they expect to be used to support lines of policy already decided upon.

7. The position of the individual service intelligence agency, on the other hand, is relatively unambiguous. Each is responsible to its Chief of Staff and to his demands for departmental support. In theory the needs to support the service secretary could introduce into a service intelligence agency some of the strains that afflict DIA in its OSD-JCS relationships, but this does not seem to be occur in practice.

8. It should be noted in passing that the service intelligence chiefs sit at USIB as observers. Though they may indicate dissents and differences by footnotes in the body of an Estimate, they are not listed individually as having participated or concurred in the preparation of the Estimate.

9. It should be further noted that the service intelligence agencies operate within an environment where the idea that G-2 serves the needs of G-3 is applied in very ~~day-to-day~~ ^{practical and} operational (not to say ~~practical~~) ways. One of the best illustrations of

this is the amount of threat forecast projecting that takes place in each of the services. This area of activity invariably involves the service intelligence

agency because the description of the future threat -- *whether done in-house or by a contractor --* must start with some intelligence input. The DOD Study of Intelligence Threat Projections of 3 April 1967 found that the Army, for example, has

" 'about 50' individual units conducting studies, both in-house and contract; the 165 studies that were submitted for review by the Study Group are those that were originated at the Department of the Army or those that reached the cognizance of that level. All of these... required an intelligence threat adjunct. The other services appear to have had requirements that reflect a similar effort."

The Study notes that the "Army's unofficial estimate is that 70 to 85 percent of their studies either are produced by private contractors or contain contractor contributions." And finally, the Study observes that the sample of 558 studies "reflects those which contribute directly and importantly to decision-making in doctrine and weapon systems selection at the responsible DOD levels."

10. The two factors -- the nature of the service intelligence agencies' relationship to the National Intelligence Estimate, and their deep involvement in

supplying the intelligence rationale for departmental weapons systems studies and proposals -- probably are related to the performance of the service agencies in preparation of the major Soviet military estimates. A review of footnotes taken in the 11-3 and 11-8 series, 1962 through 1967, shows the Air Force with 33, Army 9, Navy 10, and DIA 7. (This counts only footnotes to the Conclusions sections; by limiting the count to the ^{Time} ~~time~~ of DIA's existence, a particularly rich ^{period} ~~time~~ -- 1960 and 1961 -- for Army versus Air Force footnotes in 11-8 is ^{omitted.} ~~not recorded.~~) The number of footnotes in 11-8 has been dropping and this year reached a new low of only two, both Air Force. Footnotes in 11-3 reached a new high this year (or a new low, depending on your point of view).

1b. The nature of the footnotes has almost consistently reflected the ~~departmental~~ concern of the individual service intelligence chief over the implications of the intelligence judgments for his department's mission. The remarkable outpouring of footnotes on the Tallinn system in 11-3-67 is a good case in point. After seven paragraphs of calling attention to "uncertainties," General Carroll says that "on balance, he believes it unlikely that the system presently being deployed possesses an ABM capability." He has no weapon systems to defend and he is responsible to OSD. The Army Chief believes

that the Tallinn system has "a defensive capability against the aerodynamic threat" and, "when augmented by the Hen House radar, a capability against ballistic missiles over a substantial portion of the present deployment area." He represents the service which has the go-ahead on a light ABM defense in the US and is openly hoping for a heavy ABM deployment. The Air Force Chief believes "that the Tallinn system probably was designed for an^d now possesses an area ABM capability ^{even} ~~with~~ without inputs from the Hen House/Dog House radars." He represents the service which buys the land-based missiles and warheads that have to penetrate any Soviet ABM defense. The Navy Chief believes "that the Tallinn system has negligible capabilities against ballistic missiles." Dog House/Hen House deployment doesn't look like much of a threat to Polaris *so far.*

12. On a final note that may be related to the problem of DIA and the service intelligence agencies: as mentioned above, the service chiefs sit in USIB as observers. In USIB subcommittees, on the other hand, the Army, Air Force, and Navy members usually sit in full equality. This gives them a considerable capacity to influence work being done and judgments being made

irrespective of their ability to contribute constructively to problems at hand. The Army rep at the meeting on the 11-14 Post Mortem was most explicit about matters when he called for an interagency group to replace the Joint CIA-DIA Team working on USSR reinforcement capabilities. When challenged by the DIA rep on what Army could contribute to the study of the problems, he said Army could do nothing by way of analysis but it wanted to have a hand in casting the final conclusions. Similar kinds of problems crop up in GMAIC and COMIREX, and, as the 11-3-67 exercise shows, in USIB itself.

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